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Abstract 
 
 
 Abilities associated with adjudicative competence were assessed among 927 adolescents in 
juvenile detention facilities and community settings.  Adolescents’ abilities were compared to those of 
466 young adults in jails and in the community.   Participants at four locations across the United States 
completed a standardized measure of abilities relevant for competence to stand trial (the MacArthur 
Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication) as well as a new procedure for assessing 
psychosocial influences on legal decisions often required of defendants (MacArthur Judgment 
Evaluation).    Youths aged 15 and younger performed more poorly than did young adults, with a greater 
proportion manifesting a level of impairment consistent with that of persons found incompetent to stand 
trial.  Adolescents also tended more often than young adults to make choices (e.g., about plea agreements) 
that reflected compliance with authority, as well as influences of psychosocial immaturity.    Implications 
of these results for policy and practice are discussed, with an emphasis on the development of legal 
standards that recognize immaturity as a potential predicate of incompetence to stand trial. 
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Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: 
 
A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants 
 
 
 During the 1990s, nationwide legal reforms lowered the age at which youths could be tried in 
adult criminal court and expanded the range of young offenders subject to adult adjudication and 
punishment, (Snyder & Sickmund, 1999); at the same time, the severity of penalties available to the 
juvenile court increased (Torbet et al., 1996).  These legal developments raise an important issue that has 
received surprisingly little attention:  whether youths charged with crimes have the developmental 
capacities needed to participate effectively in their trials.   
It is well established that a criminal proceeding meets the constitutional requirements of due 
process only when the defendant is competent to stand trial, which includes capacities to assist counsel 
and to understand the nature of the proceeding sufficiently to participate in it and make decisions about 
rights afforded all defendants (Dusky v. U.S., 1960; Godinez v. Moran, 1993).   Although courts and 
legislatures in some states have determined that youths adjudicated in juvenile court and criminal court 
must be competent to stand trial, the conventional standard that has been applied focuses on mental illness 
and disability.  In general, there has been little recognition that youths in criminal court may be 
incompetent due to developmental immaturity (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000; Redding & Frost, 2002). 
 Until now, little meaningful data have been available regarding the capacities of adolescents 
relevant for adjudicative competence.   A few studies have examined youths’ understanding of the nature 
of trials and trial procedures (for reviews, see:  Grisso, 1997, 2000; Mumley et al., in press), but typically 
they have included small sample sizes, measures that are seriously limited in content or known reliability, 
or no comparison between the capacities of adolescents and adults.   Similarly, exploratory studies have 
found significant age-related increases in youths’ performance on tasks that parallel decisions that 
defendants are expected to make (Abramovitch, Peterson-Badali & Rohan, 1995; Peterson-Badali & 
Abramovitch, 1993; Peterson-Badali et al., 1997), but without comparison to adults.     
 Information about youths’ competence to stand trial (CST) is needed for several reasons.  First, 
states need guidance for the development of meaningful laws in this area.   The doctrine regulating CST 
has focused on adult criminal defendants impaired by mental illness and mental retardation.   Yet basic 
research on cognitive and psychosocial development suggests that some youths will manifest deficits in 
legally-relevant abilities similar to deficits seen in adults with mental disabilities, but for reasons of 
immaturity rather than mental disorder (see generally, Grisso & Schwartz, 2000).   If there were empirical 
evidence for this, it would suggest that the criminal law should take immaturity into consideration when 
evaluating the adjudicative competence of youths in criminal court. 
Second, practitioners need information about youths’ capacities as trial defendants, including 
their CST.   Prosecutors and defense attorneys must make case-by-case decisions about whether to raise 
this issue.  Mental health professionals who are asked to perform evaluations of youths’ CST need 
guidance regarding the potential implications of youths’ developmental status for assessing deficits in the 
legally relevant abilities.  This may require attention to different constructs (immaturity, not only 
disorder) and a different logic (e.g., the “achievement” rather than “restoration” of competence among 
those found incompetent) than in adult CST evaluations prompted by putative mental illnesses.   Finally, 
judges need guidance in interpreting the law in order to protect young defendants who may be 
incompetent, especially in their abilities to make decisions to waive important rights in the context of 
their potentially immature perspectives regarding the implications of their choices. 
Past analyses of the legal concept of adjudicative competence have outlined the specific 
functional abilities about which the law is concerned in competence cases (Grisso, 2002), as well as their 
classification into broader psycholegal constructs (e.g., Understanding, Reasoning, Appreciation: see 
Grisso & Appelbaum, 1998; Hoge et al., 1997; Otto et al., 1998; Poythress et al, 1999).    These abilities 
focus on the fundamental aspects of adjudicative competence, or what Bonnie (1992, 1993) called 
“competence to proceed”: a basic comprehension of the purpose and nature of the trial process 
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(Understanding), the capacity to provide relevant information to counsel and to process information 
(Reasoning), and the ability to apply information  to one’s own situation in a manner that is neither 
distorted nor irrational (Appreciation).   
Some studies have suggested that preadolescents have less knowledge of trials and legal concepts 
than older adolescents (e.g., Peterson-Badali et al., 1997) or adults (Grisso, 1981).   General 
developmental research on adolescents’ cognitive abilities (see Keating, 1990), however, would not lead 
us to expect substantial differences between “average” adolescents and adults in their ability to grasp 
everyday factual or conceptual information that is provided to them, or their ability to cognitively process 
it to make decisions.   In addition, results of basic developmental research on youths’ cognitive abilities 
do not necessarily generalize to abilities to deal specifically with trial-related tasks of comprehension and 
information processing, and to the abilities of the population of juveniles facing adjudication for alleged 
offenses, many of whom are of below-average intelligence.  A few studies have employed brief, 
specialized “competency screening” measures (e.g., Cooper, 1997) to assess the abilities of youths in this 
relevant population, but these measures typically focus on “understanding,” failing to assess the wider 
range of abilities associated with trial competence.   
Bonnie (1992, 1993) suggested that, in addition to defendants’ basic understanding and reasoning 
abilities, their “decisional competence” may be significant in cases in which defendants must make 
important decisions about the waiver of constitutional rights.  A potentially important difference between 
adolescents and adults in this regard involves maturity of judgment.   Differences between adolescents 
and adults are not only cognitive, but also involve aspects of psychosocial maturation that include 
progress toward greater future orientation, better risk perception, and less susceptibility to peer influence.   
Several authors have hypothesized that these developmental factors could result in differences between 
adolescents’ and adults’ decisionmaking about important rights in the adjudicative process (Cauffman & 
Steinberg, 2000; Scott, 1992; Scott, Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996). 
Current law does not include these developmental factors as relevant when considering a 
defendant’s adjudicative competence.   For example, when making a decision about waiver of important 
rights, defendants are free to place a primary value on their immediate gratification at the expense of their 
future welfare, or to opt to please their friends rather than act in their best interests, as long as they 
adequately understand and grasp the consequences of their choices.   But if adolescents place a relatively 
higher value on immediate gratification than adults as a consequence of their developmental immaturity, 
they may make different legal decisions than they themselves would make in their adult years.  Although 
psychosocial immaturity is not addressed in the formal legal construct of competence to stand trial, it 
needs to be investigated in this context to provide a comprehensive account of adolescents’ capacities to 
participate in the trial process. 
 In the present study, we used two tools to examine the two types of capacities outlined above.   
The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA) focuses primarily 
on the formal functional abilities typically associated with the legal construct of competence to stand trial 
(Bonnie’s “competence to proceed”).    In a large-scale study, the instrument manifested meaningful 
differences among adult defendants with and without findings of incompetence to stand trial (Otto et al., 
1998), and a MacCAT-CA manual subsequently was published with adult norms (Poythress et al., 1999).   
Although the instrument is now widely known among forensic mental health professionals, the extent of 
its use is not known, and its recent publication has not yet produced additional research findings.   There 
are no reports of its use with youths.    
In contrast to the MacCAT-CA, the MacArthur Judgment Evaluation (MacJEN) was designed for 
this study as a research tool to examine the question of immaturity of judgment, especially the potential 
relation between immaturity and choices that defendants make in the course of adjudication.  As 
described later, the MacJEN uses three vignettes and structured interview questions with objective 
categories of responses.  It allows for examination of differences in choices across ages, as well as the 
relation between choices and three psychosocial factors (risk appraisal, future orientation, and resistance 
to peer influence) with theoretical developmental significance (that is, are theoretically expected to 
change from childhood to adulthood).   The MacJEN measures these factors as features of respondents’ 
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reasons for their choices.   We anticipated that adolescents and adults might differ on these developmental 
dimensions in the reasons for their choices, and thus in the maturity of their judgment.   
Research to address the major policy and practical questions about juveniles’ adjudicative 
competence requires data from youths representing the relevant adolescent age range, as well as from 
adults to whom their performance can be compared.   In the present study, we selected 11-17 as the 
adolescent age range, because very few youths are arrested on delinquencies below 11 and because 
juvenile justice jurisdiction in most states does not exceed 17.  Our comparison group included young 
adults aged 18-24, because this represents the age range most commonly seen by the criminal courts and 
permits a legally-relevant, although conservative, test of the differences between adolescents and adults in 
abilities related to adjudicative competence.   
Two groups of youths and two groups of young adults were studied: those currently detained 
within the juvenile detention centers or adult jails, and those in the community with no current (and little 
past) juvenile or criminal court involvement.   We reasoned that any age differences in competence-
relevant abilities could be more reliably interpreted if they were found in both justice system and 
community samples.  
In summary, the current study was designed to address three basic questions:   
• Do adolescents differ from young adults in abilities to participate in their trials? 
• If so, what types of youths manifest significant differences from young adults? 
• What kinds of deficits in abilities are salient for law, policy, and practice in this area? 
Method 
Greater detail regarding the study’s sample, instruments, and procedures is available in an 
archival report of the study’s method, available at www.mac-adoldev-juvjustice.org.  
Participants and Sites 
The study used a four-group design of adolescents and young adults, drawn from the justice 
system and the general community.   Participants included 927 “youths” aged 11 to 17 and 466 “young 
adults” ages 18 to 24.  (Youths’ ages were further grouped 11 to 13, 14 to 15, and 16 to 17 during data 
analysis.)   “Detained” participants (Detained Youths = 453; Detained Adults = 233) resided in juvenile 
detention facilities or adult jails.  “Community” participants (Community Youths = 474; Community 
Adults = 233) were individuals residing in the same or similar communities as the Detained participants, 
and who reported during recruitment that they had never been held overnight in a justice system facility 
and were not currently charged with any offenses.  (Recruitment of these participants is described in 
“Procedure.”) 
These 1,393 participants were among 1,429 individuals originally enrolled in the study; 10 
participants were dropped from the analyses because of excessive missing data, 2 because they were 25 
years of age, and 24 because they obtained IQ scores below 60 (for which one of the study’s dependent 
measures had not been normed).    
Tables 1 and 2 show the demographic composition of the study groups.   Males composed 66.3% 
of the Detained sample and 56.8% of the Community sample.  The ethnic composition of the sample was 
about 40% African-American, 23% Hispanic, 35% non-Hispanic white, 1% Asian, and 1% from other 
ethnic identities; these proportions were similar across age and Detained/Community groups.  Most 
participants in both the Detained samples (75% and 77%) and Community samples (62% and 73%) were 
classified in the two lowest socioeconomic classes using the Hollingshead (1975) system.   Current 
charges for the Detained youths were primarily (about 80%) offenses against persons and offenses against 
property, in about equal proportions.   Charges for the Detained adults were primarily (about 80%) drug-
related, against persons, or against property, in about equal proportions.  The distribution of charges did 
not differ between the youth and young adult groups, except that drug-related charges were more frequent 
in the Detained adult sample (32%) than in the Detained youth sample (10%).    
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
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To enhance ethnic diversity and minimize bias due to geographic location, the study employed 
four data collection sites.  (A project coordinating team at a fifth site was responsible for cross-site 
training, consultation, monitoring data collection procedures, and managing the data base.)  Data were 
collected in Los Angeles (n = 404; 29% of total sample), Philadelphia (n = 390; 28%), northern Florida (n 
= 223; 16%) and northern, central and western Virginia (n = 376; 27%) at 11 juvenile detention centers, 8 
adult jails, and their surrounding communities.  Each site contributed an approximately equal number of 
Detained and Community participants.  Each site contributed participants to every age/gender/ethnicity 
cell, although site contributions to ethnic groups were disproportionate, reflecting the ethnic composition 
of each site.   
It was not possible to compare the demographic characteristics of the Detained participants to the 
characteristics of the total detained population of each detainment facility, because total admissions data 
were unavailable.   The age proportions in our Detained youth samples, however, appeared to be 
representative of juvenile detention centers generally, and the proportions of different ethnic groups in the 
Detained youth sample were nearly identical to those reported in a national survey of juvenile detention 
centers (Snyder and Sickmund, 1995).     
Independent Variables 
Demographic and Justice System Experience Variables.   We obtained data regarding age, 
gender, ethnicity, offense charged (for Detained participants), and socioeconomic status by self-report.  
SES was determined using education and occupation according to the Hollingshead system (1975), which 
provides five classifications ranging from I (highest class) to V (lowest class).   In analyses in which the 
interaction between SES and a second variable (e.g., age) was of interest, SES was treated as either a five-
level or a three-level (Hollingshead classes I-II, III, and IV-V) categorical variable. In analyses in which 
socioeconomic status was covaried, SES was treated as a continuous variable, with scores ranging from 1 
to 5.   For the Detained samples, experience in the justice system was coded from answers to two 
questions: whether the participant had (a) ever before been “found guilty” of a delinquency or crime and 
(b) ever before been “locked up” in a detention center or jail (coding “no” to both questions as “0,” “yes” 
to only one of the questions as “1,” and “yes” to both questions as “2”).    
Intelligence.   The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) (Psychological 
Corporation, 1999) produces an estimate of general intellectual ability based on two subtests (Vocabulary 
and Matrix Reasoning) that can be administered in approximately 15 minutes.  The WASI is linked to the 
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC-III) and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-
III), and has been normed for individuals ages 6 to 89 years. 
Mental Health Problems.  The Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument-Second Version 
(MAYSI-2) (Grisso & Barnum, 2000; Grisso, Barnum, Fletcher, Cauffman & Peuschold, 2001) is a 52-
item, six-scale yes/no self-report mental health screening inventory that provides indexes of degree of 
disturbance on six clinical scales (Alcohol/Drug  Use, Angry-Irritable, Depressed-Anxious, Somatic 
Complaints, Suicide Ideation, Thought Disturbance).  Two items were modified for use with young adults 
in this study; in each, the word “school” was replaced with the word “work.”  Alpha coefficients for 
Detained and Community youth and young  adult samples were comparable to acceptable coefficients 
published in earlier MAYSI-2 reports (Grisso & Barnum, 2000; Grisso et al., 2001), with the exception of 
one scale (Thought Disturbance), which did not achieve acceptable alpha coefficients for any of the 
subgroups.  
Dependent Variables 
Functional Abilities Related to Competence to Stand Trial.   The primary dependent variable was 
the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA), designed to assess 
criminal defendants’ abilities to participate in their defense (“competence to stand trial”) (Otto, et al., 
1998; Poythress et al., 1999).   The instrument’s scoring criteria, as well as norms based on large, national 
samples of pretrial adult defendants, are provided in the MacCAT-CA manual.  At the time of the present 
study, there were no publications reporting use of the MacCAT-CA with adolescents.   The standard 
administration and content of the MacCAT-CA were unaltered for the present study.   
 7
The 22 MacCAT-CA items are grouped into three subscales: Understanding, Reasoning, and 
Appreciation.  Understanding assesses comprehension of courtroom procedures and personnel and the 
defendant’s rights at trial. Reasoning assesses the recognition of information relevant to a legal defense 
and the ability to process information for legal decision-making.  The Appreciation subscale, referring to 
a person’s ability to recognize the relevance of information for one’s own situation, assesses whether a 
defendant’s legal decision-making is influenced by symptoms of mental illness, such as delusional 
thinking.   
  The present study employed mean subscale scores on the three MacCAT-CA scales, as well as a 
system of classifying MacCAT-CA subscale scores into three hierarchical categories using cut-off scores 
provided in the MacCAT-CA manual indicating “minimal or no impairment,” “mild impairment,” or 
“clinically significant impairment.”   The cut-off score for “clinically significant impairment” is set at the 
score equaling 1.5 standard deviations below the mean of the “presumed competent” samples in the 
original MacCAT-CA norming study (Poythress et al., 1999).  Performance above 1.0 standard deviation 
below the mean for those samples is considered to represent “minimal or no impairment.”   Scores 
between those two cut-offs were labeled “mild impairment.”    
  Inter-rater reliability for the MacCAT-CA was assessed twice using all scorers (25 research 
assistants) at all four of the study sites.  For Understanding and Reasoning, intra-class correlations for 
youth data were marginally adequate early in the data collection process (.63 and .60, respectively), and 
better at a later point in the study (.91 and .80; for young adults, .88 and .70).   Intra-class correlations for 
Appreciation were much more variable, ranging from .86 for youths early in the study to .17 for young 
adults later in the study.   The latter result apparently was due to highly truncated scores on Appreciation 
items, with almost no young adult participants producing 0-credit responses.  
Decisions and Judgment in the Adjudicative Process.   The MacArthur Judgment Evaluation 
(MacJEN), developed for this study and based on an earlier instrument (Woolard, 1998), was designed to 
provide data regarding age-related differences in choices and the psychosocial factors that might 
influence those choices.  The MacJEN uses vignettes to pose three legal decisions common in the 
delinquency/criminal process: (a) responding to police interrogation, (b) disclosing information during 
consultation with a defense attorney (one-half of the participants were administered a vignette about a 
public defender and one-half a vignette about a privately retained attorney); and (c) responding to a plea 
agreement for reduced consequences in exchange for a guilty plea and testimony against other defendants.   
Respondents are given several response choices and asked to recommend a “best choice” and 
“worst choice” for the vignette character.   Choices for the police interrogation vignette include 
confessing to the offense, denying the offense, and refusing to speak.  Choices for the attorney 
consultation vignette include full disclosure, partial disclosure, denying the offense and refusing to 
cooperate.   Choices for the plea agreement vignette include accepting or rejecting the offer for reduced 
charges in exchange for testimony against other defendants.  Participants’ “best choice” recommendations 
for the vignette character were used to create a variable indicating readiness to comply with authority 
figures.   
MacJEN responses were also scored according to criteria designed to identify three variables 
representing aspects of psychosocial maturity: risk appraisal (represented by three indexes), future 
orientation, and resistance to peer influence.    
To assess risk appraisal, participants were asked to identify all positive and negative 
consequences, or risks, of each best and worst choice recommendation, the likelihood of a given set of 
risks, and the unpleasantness of those risks.   These responses contributed to three separate indexes 
conceptualized as different aspects of risk appraisal: (a) “ risk recognition,” which summed the total 
number of risks identified across the best and worst choices in each vignette and then averaged across 
vignettes; (b) “risk likelihood,” which summed participants’ Likert-type responses to questions that asked 
about the likelihood that possible negative consequences would occur; and (c) “risk impact,” which 
summed participants’ Likert-type responses  to questions regarding how unpleasant the negative 
consequences would be if they did occur.  
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The second psychosocial maturity variable, future orientation, was assessed by coding all of the 
risks identified by each participant as reflecting the short-range or long-range nature of their 
consequences (employing a standardized classification system).    Long-range risks were averaged across 
vignettes to produce an index of future orientation. 
The third psychosocial maturity variable, resistance to peer influence, was assessed with 
questions asked after participants had made their original choices, posing new information to them about 
peers’ recommendations that were contrary to the participants’ choices.  For each decisionmaking 
vignette, peer resistance was measured as a dichotomous variable (retained original choice versus 
switched to peers’ choice).   
Procedure 
 Prior to data collection, all site project directors and research assistants met at one location for 
several days of training by the project coordinating team.  The project coordinators then supervised 
research teams on site during practice protocol administrations at cooperating facilities.    
Research assistants visited the participating juvenile detention centers and adult jails once or 
twice a week for about 11 months.   They were assisted by staff to identify new detainees who had arrived 
since the previous visit, and to determine whether any detainees had been “screened out” by staff or 
participant advocates regarding potential research participation.    Special protections for human subjects 
in research were required because Detained participants were identified as belonging to “vulnerable” 
populations.  Independent participant advocates monitored the solicitation of Detained youths, assuring 
conditions of voluntary youth assent and vetoing specific youths’ participation if it might pose 
unnecessary stress.   In addition, parents in some sites were notified by mail prior to approaching 
Detained youths, and youths whose parents responded indicating that they objected were not included.  
All human subjects procedures were approved by the IRB of the university at which the coordinating site 
was located as well as the IRB of the university associated with each data collection site. 
 Any detainees who had not been screened out were approached by research assistants with an 
explanation of the study, the procedure, and a request for assent to participate.   As the study period 
progressed, Detained youths and adults were approached more selectively in order to augment 
contributions to age, gender and/or ethnicity subsamples that accrued in smaller proportions in detained 
settings.   Females and very young adolescents especially were over-sampled in proportion to their actual 
representation in detention and jail facilities.   
Community youths and young adults were solicited in neighborhoods served by the relevant 
youth detention or adult jail facilities.   Community youths were solicited in schools, youth programs, and 
Girls’ and Boys’ Clubs, while community adults were solicited in community clubs, agencies and 
shelters, and at community colleges, using posters, leaflets, and/or direct contact by research assistants.    
Human subjects considerations required parental consent for Community youths.   As data collection 
proceeded, the age by gender by ethnic proportions that were accruing in the Detained samples were 
examined periodically to guide a more selective approach to the recruitment of potential Community 
participants, aiming at final Community samples that were demographically similar to their respective 
Detained samples.    
It was not possible to determine participation rates for either the detained or community samples 
because of the way in which subjects were recruited in each group.  In the case of detained subjects, 
detainees in each facility were periodically informed of the study by facility staff persons and asked if 
they were interested in speaking with a research staff member about the project; this was done on a 
regular basis because the population of detainees changed daily.  Facility staff did not approach detainees 
whom they believed were especially vulnerable or otherwise unqualified to participate in the study (e.g., 
due to mental illness, recent trauma, etc.). It was not possible to monitor how many detainees were 
approached by facility staff and what proportion refused to speak with the research staff.  Generally 
speaking, however, very few detainees with whom we were permitted to speak refused to participate.  The 
recruitment of the community participants was done by posting advertisements about the study in 
community centers, schools, and recreation centers. Individuals who were interested in the study were 
asked to call our research office. 
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All participation was voluntary.  Detained youths and adults received $10 for their participation 
(or snacks in some facilities that did not allow monetary awards); community youths and adults received 
$25.  Informed and signed consent (assent for youths) was required for all participants.  Confidentiality 
was assured with the exception of the researchers’ obligation to report to others in cases in which 
information was obtained that suggested imminent risk of harm to self or others, or danger of harm from 
others.   Participants endorsing two out of three critical “Suicide Ideation” items on the MAYSI-2 were 
screened further by research assistants using a structured process to obtain data on seriousness and 
recency of suicidal intent.  Responses were evaluated in consultation with the site project director or a site 
clinician, as well as the project coordinator, to determine the need to breach confidentiality.  (See 
reference in Footnote 1 for details on frequency with which breaching confidentiality was required.) 
When a participant had consented/assented, the research assistant administered the study 
protocol, obtaining demographic and justice experience data first, followed by the MacCAT-CA, the 
WASI, the MAYSI-2, and the MacJEN.   The protocol typically required between 90 and 180 minutes to 
administer.   The project coordination team continuously monitored the data collection process and 
compliance with ethical procedures at the four data collection sites.   Research assistants at each site 
scored their own protocols, and scored copies were sent to the coordinating site for quality checks, data 
entry, and database management.       
Results 
MacCAT-CA:  Age Differences in Performance¹  
 Preliminary analyses indicated that the four age groups did not differ significantly with respect to 
gender or ethnicity, but did differ significantly, albeit slightly, with respect to social class and 
intelligence.  As a consequence, all comparisons between age groups controlled for these latter two 
variables. 
 In order to examine age differences in MacCAT-CA performance, a multiple analysis of 
covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted with the three MacCAT-CA subscale scores (Understanding, 
Reasoning, and Appreciation) as the dependent variables, age group as the independent variable, and the 
continuous measure of socioeconomic status and IQ as covariates. The analysis indicated a significant 
multivariate effect for age (multivariate F (9, 3263)=11.32, p<.001), with significant univariate effects for 
age on all three subscales (for Understanding, F(3,1343)=16.24, p<.001; for Reasoning, F(3,1343)=19.33, 
p<.001; for Appreciation, F(3,1343)=18.06, p<.001).  As shown in Table 3, post-hoc contrasts indicated 
that, on the Understanding subscale, the 11-13 year-olds performed significantly worse than the 14-15 
year-olds, who performed significantly worse than the two older groups; 16-17 year-olds and young 
adults did not differ.  On Reasoning, 11-13 year-olds performed significantly worse than 14-15 year-olds, 
who performed significantly worse than the 16-17 year olds; 14-15 year-olds and 16-17 year-olds did not 
differ from young adults.  On the Appreciation subscale, 11-13 year-olds performed significantly worse 
than 14-15 year olds, who scored lower than young adults, but did not differ from 16-17 year olds; as with 
the other two subscales, 16-17 year-olds and young adults did not differ.  In general, the magnitude of the 
difference (i.e., the effect size) between the scores of the 11-13 year-olds versus adults was moderate by 
conventional statistical standards (e.g., ds between .5 and .6) whereas the differences between the scores 
of the 14-15 year-olds and adults were small (e.g., ds between .2 and .3) 
               -------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
 These patterns of age differences were also seen when chi-square analyses were used to compare 
age groups (both with and without controlling for IQ and socioeconomic status) with respect to the 
proportions of individuals showing various levels of impairment—“no impairment,” “mild impairment,” 
or “significant impairment” (Poythress et al., 1999)—	
  49.60, p<.001) and 

 
 !"#
$%-13 year-olds, and 
13% of 14-15 year-olds, showed significantly impaired Understanding, only 7% of the 16-17 year olds 
and this same proportion of adults scored in this range.  Similarly, proportions of individuals showing 
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significantly impaired Reasoning declined from 16% among 11-13 year-olds to 9% among 14-15 year-
olds, to less than 7% among 16-17 year-olds and young adults.   
 It is important to examine the proportions of each age group who show significantly impaired 
Understanding or Reasoning (or both), because significant impairment in either could raise doubts about 
competence.  These results are presented in Figure 2, illustrating that 30% of 11-13 year-olds, and 19% of 
14-15-year-olds, were significantly impaired on one or both of these subscales; the figures for 16-17 year 
olds and for young adults were both 12%.  
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
In order to examine whether these patterns of age differences varied as a function of gender, 
ethnicity, or Detained vs. Community status, a 4 (age group) by 2 (gender) by 3 (ethnicity) by 2 
(Detained/Community status) multiple analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was conducted with the 
three MacCAT-CA subscale scores (Understanding, Reasoning, and Appreciation) as the dependent 
variables and socioeconomic status and IQ as covariates.  MacCAT-CA performance was unrelated to 
Detained/Community status, gender, and ethnicity.  More importantly, the only interaction to reach 
significance was the two-way interaction between age and Detained/Community status (multivariate F (9, 
3157)=2.465, p<.01), and the univariate effect was significant only for scores on the Understanding 
subscale (F(3, 1299)=6.09, p<.001).  Follow-up analyses indicated that, whereas Detained and 
Community young adults differed significantly in Understanding scores, Detained and Community 
juveniles (of any age) did not.   
In a separate analysis that treated socioeconomic status as a three-level independent variable 
rather than a covariate, we did not find significant main effects for SES or a significant interaction 
between SES and age.  The absence of significant interactions between age and gender, age and ethnicity, 
and age and SES indicates that age differences in MacCAT-CA performance were consistent between 
males and females, across individuals from different ethnic groups, and across individuals from different 
socioeconomic backgrounds when controlled for IQ. 
 Patterns of age differences in the proportions of individuals showing no impairment, mild 
impairment, or significant impairment on Understanding are shown separately for the Detained and 
Community samples in Figure 3.  As the Figure illustrates, the proportions of individuals showing mild or 
significant impairment in Understanding differed between Detained and Community adults but were 
relatively similar among Detained and Community juveniles. 
 When chi-square analyses were used to compare the Detained and Community groups with 
respect to the proportions of individuals in each age group who demonstrate significantly impaired 
Understanding or Reasoning (or both), similar patterns of age differences in the two groups emerged 
(both with and without controlling for IQ and socioeconomic status).   As Figure 4 illustrates, although 
impairment was more common among Detained than Community individuals, in both groups, 11-13 year 
olds, and to a lesser extent 14-15 year olds, were more likely than adults to show deficits in the capacities 
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to that of young adults. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
MacCAT-CA:  Intelligence, Prior Justice System Experience, Mental Health Problems 
 
  MacCAT-CA performance may be influenced by factors other than age, including intelligence 
(which one would be expect to be positively related to MacCAT performance), mental health problems 
(expected to be negatively related to MacCAT-CA performance), and prior experience in the justice 
system (expected to be positively related to MacCAT-CA performance).  To examine these relations, we 
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conducted a series of multiple regression analyses, regressing scores for each of the MacCAT-CA 
subscales on age (as a continuous variable), IQ, each of the six subscales of the MAYSI-2, and our 
measure of prior experience in the justice system (for justice system participants only).  As expected, IQ 
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MacCAT-CA performance was unrelated to our measure of prior experience in the justice system and 
largely unrelated to MAYSI-2 mental health problems.    
 Figure 5 shows the relation between IQ, treated as a three-level categorical variable (IQ=60-74, 
75-89, or 90 and above) and impairment on the three MacCAT-CA subscales.  As expected, chi-square 
analyses showed that individuals of lower intelligence were more likely to have impaired Understanding 
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Figure 6 displays the proportions of individuals in each IQ group who were significantly impaired on 
either the Understanding or the Reasoning scales (or both).  Again, individuals of lower intelligence were 
far more likely to lack these capacities related to participation in trials as defendants. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 5 and 6 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
To examine whether the relations between MacCAT-CA performance and intelligence and justice 
system experience varied with age, we conducted a second series of regressions, in which the main effects 
of these variables, along with age (as a continuous variable), were entered into the equation followed by 
the terms representing the interactions between each variable and age.   Age remained a significant 
predictor of MacCAT-CA performance on all three scales, even when intelligence and prior justice 
system experience were controlled.   There were marginally significant interactions between age and IQ 
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 -.382, t(1361)=-1.909, 
p=.06), but no age by experience interaction.  
To examine the nature of these interactions, follow-up analyses were conducted in which 
correlations between MacCAT-CA performance and IQ were computed separately for each age group.  
The interaction between age and IQ in the prediction of MacCAT-CA performance is difficult to 
interpret; the correlation between IQ and Understanding generally increased with age, but the correlation 
between IQ and Appreciation generally decreased with age. 
MacCAT-CA Performance as a Function of Intelligence,  
Age, and Detained/Community Status 
It is widely established that, on average, individuals who are detained in the justice system score 
lower on intelligence tests than demographically comparable samples of individuals drawn from the 
community.   As expected, an analysis of variance showed that the average IQ score of detained 
individuals in this study (M=86.28, sd=12.95) was substantially lower than that of individuals from the 
community (M=97.46, sd=15.63) (F(3,1385)=5.64, p<.001), a finding that did not vary as a function of 
age (F(3,1385)=.48, n.s.).  In light of this, and in view of the strong relation between IQ and MacCAT-CA 
performance, we examined the associations between IQ and MacCAT-CA performance separately within 
each age group, focusing on proportions with scores in the seriously impaired range.   
Figure 7 shows the proportions of individuals of different levels of intelligence, within each age 
group, who were seriously impaired with respect to Understanding or Reasoning or both.   Younger 
individuals of lower intelligence were especially likely to be deficient in the necessary capacities 
associated with trial competence.  Indeed, among 11-13 year olds, more than one-half with an IQ between 
60 and 74, and more than one-third with an IQ between 75 and 89, were significantly impaired.  Among 
14-15 year olds, approximately 40% of those with an IQ between 60 and 74, and more than one in four 
with an IQ between 75 and 89, were comparably impaired.  These figures are important because, as 
Figure 8 illustrates, between one-fifth and one-quarter of juveniles aged 15 and younger in the Detained 
sample had IQ scores between 60 and 74, and approximately 40% of Detained juveniles aged 15 and 
younger had IQ scores between 75 and 89.  In other words, approximately two-thirds of the Detained 
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juveniles aged 15 and younger had an IQ that was associated with a significant risk of being incompetent 
to stand trial due to impaired Understanding or Reasoning or both.   
-------------------------------- 
Figures 7 and 8 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
MacJEN:  Age Differences in Choices on Decision Making Vignettes 
 Turning now to MacJEN results related to questions about participants’ legal decisionmaking, we 
examined age differences in the participants’ recommended best choice using separate chi-square 
analyses for each of the three decision-making vignettes (police interrogation, attorney consultation, plea 
agreement) (see Figure 9).  Analyses indicated significant age differences for choices regarding police 
	
	 ,0#	%
	&
	"#&#&%
	#*	
choice decreased with age, from about one-half of the 11-13 year-olds to only one-fifth of young adults.    
No age differences were found for the second vignette regarding consultation with a public defender 
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p<.001), the proportion accepting the plea agreement decreasing from 74% among 11-13 year olds to 
50% of young adults.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 9 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Because the four age groups differed significantly with respect to social class and intelligence, 
separate chi-square analyses examined age differences within three IQ categories (60-74, 75-89, 90 and 
above) and five socioeconomic status categories.  The proportion of confession and plea 
recommendations decreased with age for each IQ category (p<.005 or smaller for each analysis), except 
for the plea recommendation among low IQ participants in which no age-based differences were found. 
The proportion of confession and plea recommendations decreased with age for each SES category (p<.05 
or smaller for each analysis) except for those in the highest socioeconomic class, which was not 
statistically significant. 
 To examine whether the age effects varied across the other demographic variables, a hierarchical 
logistical regression was run for each of the three dependent variables (confess/other, full disclosure/less 
than full, accept plea/refuse plea) with all two-way age interaction terms included in the second step. 
None of the interactions was significant for the confession, disclosure to public defender, or plea 
agreement vignettes, indicating that age differences in these choices remain consistent across gender, 
ethnicity, and Detained/Community status, as well as intelligence and socioeconomic status. An ethnicity 
(white/other) by age interaction was significant for the regression on full disclosure to a private attorney.   
Specifically, there were no ethnic differences for 11-13 year olds and 14-15 year olds, but a higher 
proportion of non-Hispanic white 16-17 year olds (90%) recommended full disclosure than other ethnic 
groups of the same ages (75% of 16-17 year olds and 85% of young adults).   
MacJEN:  Age and Compliance with Authorities 
In each vignette, one decision choice represents compliance with authority—confessing to police, 
fully disclosing to the attorney, and accepting the prosecutor’s plea agreement.  An authority compliance 
score summed the number of compliant choices made across the three vignettes. An Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted with compliance as the dependent variable, and age, intelligence, and 
socioeconomic status as independent variables. The results demonstrated a significant effect for age (F (3, 
1352) = 88.71, p < .001).  Post-hoc tests indicated that the 11-13 year olds (M=2.0) did not differ from the 
14-15 year olds (M=1.8), but both groups were more compliant with authority than the two older groups; 
the 16-17 year olds (M=1.5) did not differ from the young adults (M=1.3) (see Figure 10).  
            -------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 10 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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A 4 (age group) by 2 (gender) by 3 (ethnicity) by 2 (Detained/Community status) ANOVA tested 
whether age differences in authority compliance varied by gender, ethnicity, and Detained/Community 
status when socioeconomic status and intelligence were included as covariates.  The main effect of age 
was significant and post-hoc tests were consistent with results reported above.     No significant two-way 
interactions with age were found, indicating that age differences in authority compliance remained 
constant across gender, ethnicity, and Detained/Community status.  
MacJEN:  Psychosocial Factors and Legal Decision Making 
Risk Appraisal.   Three variables assessed risk appraisal in the decision making vignettes: (a) risk 
recognition, (b) risk likelihood (as perceived by the participant), and (c) risk impact (how unpleasant the 
negative consequences would be if they did occur).  
An ANOVA with age, IQ, and SES as independent variables and risk recognition as the 
dependent variable resulted in main effects for all three independent variables.   Post-hoc tests of the age 
effect (F (3, 1368) = 5.18, p<.001) indicated that 11-13 year olds (M=3.0) scored lower than 16-17 year 
olds (M=3.3) and young adults (M=3.3); the 14-15 year olds (M=3.1) were not significantly different 
from any other age group.  
Main effects for age (F(3, 1368)=14.26, p<.001) and socioeconomic status (F(4, 1368)=4.08, 
p<.01) were found in an ANOVA with average risk likelihood as the dependent variable.   Young adults 
reported significantly higher likelihood of risk (M=13.7) than the three adolescent groups, which did not 
differ from each other.  
In the analysis of age, intelligence, and socioeconomic status with average risk impact as the 
dependent variable, only a main effect of age was significant (F(3, 1368) = 8.37, p<.001). The youngest 
participants (M=14.5) and 14-15 year olds (M=14.6) scored lower than young adults (M=15.2).  The 16-
17 year olds (15.0) were significantly higher than 14-15 year olds but did not differ from young adults. 
Future Orientation.  Recognition of future consequences was indexed by the average number of 
long-range consequences identified across vignettes. An ANOVA resulted in main effects for age (F(3, 
1368)=3.56, p<.01) and intelligence (F(2, 1368)=28.46, p<.001), but not socioeconomic status (F(4, 
1368)=11.54, ns).  The 11-13 year olds reported fewer long-range consequences (M=7.8) than the 16-17 
year olds (M=8.6).  The 14-15 year olds (M=8.1) and young adults (M=8.5) were not significantly 
different from any other group. All three intelligence categories were significantly different from each 
other; average long-range consequence scores increased as intelligence increased (M=7.3, 8.2, 9.2).   
Resistance to Peer Influence.   Resistance to peer influence was measured by comparing the 
participants’ original choice in each decision making vignette to their choice under a condition of peer 
influence in which peers recommended the opposite course of action (e.g., if a participant stated that they 
would confess to the police, peers recommended remaining silent).  For each decision making vignette, 
resistance to peer influence was measured as a dichotomous variable (resisted influence and retained 
original choice versus influenced by peers and switched to peers’ choice). We used age group, gender, 
ethnicity, detained/community status, intelligence, socioeconomic status, the original vignette choice, and 
all two-way age interaction terms in a hierarchical logistic regression to predict whether a participant 
resisted peer pressure. 
In the police interrogation vignette, there was a significant effect for original vignette choice 
(odds ratio = 4.36), in which those who said they would confess were more resistant than those who 
would have done something else (denied or remained silent).   In addition, there was an age by original 
choice interaction (odds ratio=0.44), indicating that resistance to peers depended in part on what 
participants originally chose to do (see Figure 11).  Among participants who said they would confess, 
young adults were more likely to change their minds and remain silent than were youths, who were more 
likely to resist peer influence and confess anyway.  Of those who originally said they would remain silent, 
however, resistance increased with age.  
    -------------------------------- 
    Insert Figure 11 about here 
    -------------------------------- 
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Only the original vignette choice predicted resistance to peer influence in the attorney 
consultation vignette. Those who reported they would not fully disclose to their attorney were much less 
likely to resist peer influence than those who said they would fully disclose.  Similarly, only the original 
vignette choice predicted resistance to peer influence in the plea agreement vignette. Those who reported 
they would accept the plea agreement were more resistant to peer influence than those who refused the 
plea agreement. 
Summarizing the age-related findings with the MacJEN:  (a) age was significantly related to 
choices in two of the three legal contexts (police questioning, plea agreement), at all IQ levels; (b) youths 
15 and younger were significantly more likely to choose options that represented compliance with 
authorities in the three legal contexts; (c) compared to young adults, younger adolescents significantly 
less often recognized risks, thought that risks were likely, or thought that risks would be serious if they 
happened, with the three legal contexts; (d) youths under 14 were significantly less likely than other 
groups to provide long-range future consequences in explaining their choices; and (e) the relation between 
age and changing one’s choices in response to peer suggestions varied in complex ways with the nature of 
participants’ original choices. 
 
 
Discussion 
Review of Findings      
         Our results indicate that juveniles aged 15 and younger are significantly more likely than older 
adolescents and young adults to be impaired in ways that compromise their ability to serve as competent 
defendants in a criminal proceeding.   Based on criteria established in studies of mentally ill adult 
offenders (Otto et al, 1998; Poythress et al., 1999), approximately one-third of 11- to 13-year-olds, and 
approximately one-fifth of 14- to 15-year-olds, are as impaired in capacities relevant to adjudicative 
competence as are seriously mentally ill adults who would likely be considered incompetent to stand trial 
by clinicians who perform evaluations for courts.  Our results also indicate that the competence-relevant 
capacities of 16- and 17-year-olds as a group do not differ significantly from those of young adults.  
These patterns of age differences are robust across groups defined by gender, ethnicity, and 
socioeconomic status, and they are evident among individuals in the justice system and in the community. 
Not surprisingly, juveniles of below-average intelligence are more likely than juveniles of average 
intelligence to be impaired in abilities relevant for competence to stand trial.  Because a greater 
proportion of youths in the juvenile justice system than in the community are of below-average 
intelligence, the risk for incompetence to stand trial is therefore even greater among adolescents who are 
in the justice system than it is among adolescents in the community.    
 The results are consistent with findings from earlier studies of youths’ capacities in legal 
contexts.  For example, in a study of youths’ abilities to understand and appreciate Miranda warnings, 
Grisso (1981) found that “understanding…was significantly poorer among juveniles who were 14 years 
of age or younger than among 15-16-year-old juveniles or adult offenders…” (p. 192), and that those 
deficits were even more pronounced among youths with low IQ scores, including youths who were 15 
and 16 years of age.   Similarly, prior research on youths’ understanding and reasoning related to trial 
participation, although fragmentary, has been fairly consistent in suggesting poorer abilities among youths 
under 14 years of age (for a review, see Grisso, 1997, 2000).    
 Moving beyond formal competence to stand trial criteria, the results of our examination of 
adolescents’ and young adults’ responses to decisionmaking vignettes (the MacJEN procedure) indicate 
that psychosocial immaturity may affect the performance of youths as defendants in ways that extend 
beyond the elements of understanding and reasoning that are explicitly relevant to competence to stand 
trial.   Adolescents are more likely than young adults to make choices that reflect a propensity to comply 
with authority figures, such as confessing to the police rather than remaining silent or accepting a 
prosecutor’s offer of a plea agreement.   In addition, when being interrogated by the police, consulting 
with an attorney, or evaluating a plea agreement, younger adolescents are less likely, or perhaps less able, 
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than others to recognize the risks inherent in the various choices they face or to consider the long-term, 
and not merely the immediate, consequences of their legal decisions.  As is the case with capacities 
relevant for competence to stand trial, these patterns of age differences in legal decisionmaking generally 
do not vary with gender, ethnicity, or socioeconomic status.     
 It is difficult to compare our results on decisionmaking and psychosocial maturity with past 
studies, because there has been little research on this relationship and only one study with youths in 
juvenile or adult justice system custody.   In that study, Woolard, Fried and Reppucci (2001) found that 
decision options, outcomes and judgment factors in legally relevant vignettes changed across age.   The 
closest other parallel to our effort was a study of high school students’ decisions (in non-defendant 
contexts), which found relationships between decisions and psychosocial maturity similar to those in the 
present study (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000).  
Three limits of the study must be kept in mind when interpreting our results.  They pertain to 
measurement, sampling, and the application of the data for juvenile justice policy.  
Concerning measurement, no set of standardized observations regarding abilities associated with 
competence to stand trial can identify all of the abilities that courts might consider when making decisions 
about defendants’ competence.   The MacCAT-CA, for example, does not assess defendants’ abilities to 
assist counsel in reconstructing events at the time of the offense or to manage their behavior in the 
courtroom.   One must also be careful not to interpret our proportions of youths with “serious 
impairments” on the MacCAT-CA as the percentage of juveniles who are actually incompetent to stand 
trial; the instrument assesses capacities that are relevant for the competence question, but not legal 
competence itself.   Neither the law nor the social sciences recognizes any psychometric definition of 
legal incompetence.   
Concerning the variables in the MacJEN (risk appraisal, future orientation, and resistance to peer 
influence), this report provides evidence regarding their psychometric properties but not their construct 
validity.  A subsequent report will describe their relation to other developmental measures that examine 
similar constructs measured as general developmental concepts, in contrast to the MacJEN’s 
measurement of the concepts manifested in decisionmaking in legal contexts.   Further research will be 
required, however, to examine whether youths’ performance on the MacJEN is related to their perceptions 
and choices in real-life legal circumstances.     
Three aspects of the study’s sample potentially affect the generalizability of the findings. First, 
while we over-sampled younger adolescents in detention centers, detention populations typically do not 
have large numbers of 11-13 year old youths; as a consequence, we obtained relatively smaller samples of 
Detained youths who were younger than 14 than those 14 years or older.   Second, we were unable to 
obtain sufficient numbers of Asian youths across sites to analyze data separately for that ethnic group.   
Third, our method for obtaining the Detained samples may have reduced the number of youths in our 
samples with serious (e.g., psychotic) mental disorders.   Such youths are often diverted from detention to 
psychiatric services, or they may have been screened out of study participation by participant advocates, 
in either case making them unavailable to the study interviewers; this might not have been the case for the 
jailed adults.  If this is so, the present results should be seen as conservative age-related estimates of 
proportions of youths with serious impairments on the MacCAT-CA, since inclusion of youths with 
serious mental disorders would likely have increased those proportions.   
Finally, we caution against the application of these results to legal issues other than competence 
to stand trial.  Society is engaged in active debate concerning whether adolescents should be held 
responsible for their offenses to the same degree, and punished to the same extent, as adults (Fagan & 
Zimring, 2000).   Given the results of the present study, policymakers and practitioners may wish to 
consider whether the proportion of very young adolescents with deficits in abilities to participate in their 
trials is sufficiently great to warrant special protections against unfair adjudication as adults.   However, 
our results say nothing about whether youths’ developmental capacities render them more or less culpable 
than adults in terms of their behavior at the time of the alleged offense. 
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 Implications 
The issue that the study addresses—the relationship between immaturity and competence to stand 
trial—has been largely unnoticed (at least in policy circles) during the last decade or so, as legislatures 
around the country have moved to facilitate the adjudication of younger and younger offenders in adult 
criminal court (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000).   On reflection, however, it is obvious that the same due process 
constraints that prohibit the adjudication of mentally ill and mentally retarded defendants who do not 
understand the process they face or cannot assist their attorneys also apply to juveniles who are 
incompetent due to immaturity alone. The standard announced by the Supreme Court in Dusky v. United 
States (1960) is a functional test, and functionally it should make no difference whether the source of the 
defendant’s incompetency is mental illness or immaturity.  This study confronts policymakers and courts 
with an uncomfortable reality.  Under well-accepted constitutional restrictions on the state’s authority to 
adjudicate those charged with crimes, many young offenders—particularly among those under the age of 
14—may not be appropriate subjects for criminal adjudication. 
The findings of this study raise several important issues.   Most obvious, perhaps, are the policy and 
practice implications for the adjudication of youths in adult criminal court.  If one in three 11-13 year old 
defendants potentially may not be competent to stand trial, this should be a concern whenever a youth in 
this age group is subject to adjudication in adult criminal court.   When youths are considered for transfer 
to criminal court on the basis of judicial discretion, the simplest response would be to make a 
determination of competence a condition of criminal adjudication for younger defendants.  A few states, 
such as Virginia, already require a finding of competence to stand trial as a predicate condition before a 
court may consider the transfer of youths from juvenile to adult court (Va. Code Ann. Sect. 16.1-269.1 
(A)(3)(2001)). 
 When youths are charged directly in criminal court, the proper mechanism might be a 
requirement that an evaluation and determination of competence to stand trial would automatically 
precede the adjudication.  The optimal age boundary for an automatic inquiry into competence is not 
obvious; clearly jurisdictions and courts will vary.   It does seem clear, however, that at some minimal 
age, the risk of incompetence is so great that a determination should always be a predicate to adjudication 
in adult court.   Even with youths older than this minimum age, defense attorneys, prosecutors and judges 
should be concerned about a defendant’s competence to stand trial whenever adult adjudication is 
proposed for a juvenile.   
The findings of the study may also be relevant to the legislative determination of the minimum 
age for adjudication of youths in adult court.   Many jurisdictions have set the age bar very low for adult 
prosecution of youths for serious crimes, usually without consideration of the likelihood that many youths 
of the specified minimum age may be incompetent (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000).  Because the evaluation and 
judicial determination of competence are likely to be costly in both time and money (and because the risk 
of incompetence is substantial below age 14), a legislature might well conclude that an efficient and just 
approach is to set the minimum age of adult adjudication at an age at which competence to stand trial is 
not potentially an issue in every case.  
The findings of the study should also focus attention on the issue of competence to stand trial in 
juvenile court delinquency proceedings.  Many states extend the competence requirement to juvenile 
court adjudications, but most focus on mental illness and disability as the sources of incapacity (Redding 
& Frost, 2002).  An important consideration in expanding the doctrinal framework to include 
incompetence as a result of immaturity is whether the competence standard applied in juvenile court 
should be less demanding than that applied in adult criminal court.  This is important because the standard 
for competence in juvenile court will determine whether youths adjudicated incompetent as adults can be 
tried as juveniles.  If a less demanding standard operates in juvenile court proceedings, many younger 
defendants who lack the capacity to be adjudicated as adults can be tried in this venue. Otherwise, the 
question of how to respond to these immature defendants presents a daunting challenge.  
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We believe that a more relaxed competence standard in juvenile court is compatible with the 
demands of constitutional due process.  The Supreme Court has made clear that the requirements of due 
process in delinquency proceedings are not identical to those that regulate criminal trials (McKeiver v. 
Pennsylvania, 1971).  The justification for a separate juvenile court rests in part on the fact that it is not an 
exact replica of criminal court.  If juvenile court jurisdiction ends when the minor reaches adulthood (an 
important “if”), then the stakes of a delinquency proceeding are not as high as those faced by a youth 
charged with a felony in adult court.  Under these conditions, no constitutional bar would restrict the use 
of a more relaxed standard of adjudicative competence in juvenile court.  As Bonnie and Grisso (2000) 
have argued, in an ordinary juvenile court delinquency proceeding, the minimal criteria for adjudication 
are satisfied if the youth “has a basic understanding of the purpose of the proceedings and can 
communicate rationally with counsel” (p.97).   
This approach is not only constitutionally legitimate, but also offers a practical solution to the 
challenges that may follow when courts recognize incompetence due to developmental immaturity.  Most 
children and adolescents who are found incompetent to proceed in criminal court due to immaturity could 
likely be adjudicated in a juvenile delinquency proceeding under a more relaxed competence standard.   
In most cases, this avoids the dispositional problem of dealing with young defendants who cannot be tried 
as adults and are not likely to become competent in a reasonable time.  Several courts that have 
considered competence to stand trial in juvenile court assume that the competence demands of a 
delinquency proceeding are lower than in an adult trial, and that youths who cannot be transferred to 
criminal court due to incompetence can be tried in juvenile court (e.g., Ohio v. Settles, 1998; In the Matter 
of W.A.F, 1990). 
 The two-tier standard also minimizes the extent to which delinquency proceedings will be 
burdened by the incorporation of developmental immaturity as a basis for incompetence.  If youths in 
juvenile court must meet adult standards of competence, prosecutors legitimately might worry that 
defense attorneys in delinquency proceedings will routinely petition for competence assessments.  This 
will be unlikely if the competency standard in juvenile court is understood to be a modest one.  Those 
who care about the welfare of youths and those who worry about the efficiency of the justice process 
share a common interest in promoting practices that implement due process without creating an undue 
burden on the court system. 
Careful attention must be directed toward devising dispositions for youths who are found to be 
incompetent as a result of developmental immaturity, in part to allay fears that might arise about the 
possibility that some dangerous youths would be immune from prosecution due to immaturity—a specter 
that will alarm many people.  Whereas the disposition of mentally ill defendants is directed toward 
restoration to competence, this goal is not appropriate for immature youths who have never achieved 
competence.  A disposition that simply waits for a youth to mature until he or she is competent to stand 
trial is both politically inconceivable and constitutionally problematic.³   Unless other dispositions are 
offered, courts and legislatures are unlikely to deal seriously with developmental incompetence.  
This challenge may be less daunting than it at first appears.  As suggested above, most youths 
who are not competent to stand trial as adults due to immaturity could likely be adjudicated in juvenile 
court.   Moreover, some defendants whose incompetence is based solely on deficient understanding 
(rather than immature reasoning) could likely be tried as adults after a period  of instruction about the 
matters they do not comprehend.  Thus, the great majority of youths would be subject to adjudication on 
their criminal charges with little delay even when an assessment of their abilities indicates they do not 
meet adult competence standards.    
The more difficult questions involve appropriate dispositions for those defendants who are (a) 
charged with serious crimes and (b) are incompetent to stand trial even in juvenile court on the basis of 
their immaturity.  At least a few options other than the dismissal of charges suggest themselves as 
possible responses to this very small group of offenders.    If the youth is a danger to self or others, civil 
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commitment procedures can be initiated.  Confinement for an indefinite period to achieve sufficient 
maturity to stand trial is another option, but one that must have outer time limits.  As the Supreme Court 
made clear in Jackson v. Indiana (1972) (at least for adults), indefinite confinement of incompetent 
defendants is analogous to punishment without a trial. Another option would be to rely on social service 
or educational intervention in response to problems manifested by the child’s behavior.  For example, 
failure of parental supervision may result in removal of the child to state custody and foster care 
placement.   None of these responses is ideal; they may be more restrictive than dispositions that are 
appropriate for adults.  Nonetheless, they deserve careful consideration as responses to the unique 
developmental status of children.  
The present study compared juveniles and adults in their capacities to function in the trial process 
under established doctrinal requirements that focus on reasoning, understanding and appreciation.  But 
questions about how minors function as criminal defendants compared to adults go beyond those that are 
captured by the narrow focus of the ordinary competence inquiry.   The study indicates that psychosocial 
immaturity may affect a young person’s decisions, attitudes and behavior in the role of defendant in ways 
that do not directly implicate competence to stand trial, but that may be quite important to how they make 
choices, interact with police, relate to their attorneys, and respond to the trial context. 
Policymakers and practitioners should be concerned about these matters, and special procedures 
and strategies may be warranted when youths face criminal jeopardy.  For example, if young persons are 
more likely to talk to the police than are adults because of different attitudes toward adult authority 
figures, they may be more vulnerable to police coercion.  If so, youths may need special protection of 
their Fifth Amendment rights in the custodial context, such as a per se rule that requires the presence of 
an attorney as a predicate to interrogation (Grisso, 1980).  In the plea agreement context, judicial inquiry 
that goes beyond the standard colloquy may be needed when courts are presented with a guilty plea by a 
young defendant.  In general, those who deal with young persons charged with crimes—and particularly 
their attorneys—should be alert to the impact of psychosocial factors on youths’ attitudes and decisions, 
even when their understanding and reasoning appear to be adequate.  Deficiencies in risk perception and 
future orientation, as well as immature attitudes toward authority figures, may undermine competent 
decisionmaking in ways that standard assessments of competence to stand trial do not capture. 
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Footnotes 
 
¹   Various stages of the following analyses examined youths’ and young adults’ performance on the  
MacCAT-CA by study site across the demographic variables.   Very few site differences were found, no 
more than would be expected by chance.   
²
    We do not report proportions of individuals showing impaired appreciation, because it is not clear what 
such impairment means in a sample of individuals without serious mental illness.  This subscale of the 
MacCAT-CA was developed in order to identify individuals whose beliefsb about their trial were highly 
irrational or distorted as a result of serious mental disorder.  In the present study, the majority of 
individuals who showed “impaired” appreciation did so because they could not articulate reasons for their 
responses to certain interview questions, not because they demonstrated distorted or irrational thinking. 
³  In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), the Supreme Court held that due process requires that the 
state must either restore the incompetent defendant in a reasonable period of time or release him. 
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Table 1:  Sample Demographics 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
             Detained      Community 
         _______________________________________        ________________________________________ 
 
    Youth Age Groups          Youth   Adults   Youth Age Groups          Youth   Adults 
 
            11-13   14-15   16-17           11-17   18-24           11-13   14-15   16-17           11-17   18-24 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Participants (n)   74 186 193  453 233  116 159 199  474 233 
 
Male (% of age group)  74  62  62   64  71   52  60  57   57  57 
  
Ethnicity (% of age group) 
 
       African-American  56  32  38   39  43   41  52   33    41  37 
    
       Hispanic               21  28   25   26  25   20  20  21   20  24 
 
       Non-Hispanic White  21  35  35     32  32   36  28  44   37  37 
 
       Asian and Other        2    5    2     3          0     3    0          2     2      2 
 
Socioeconomic Status  (% of age group) 
 
 I-II      8    7  11     9    7   15  13  15   14   9 
 
 III    12  16  18   16  16   23  26  24   24 18 
 
 IV-V    80  77  71   75  77   62  61  61   62 73 
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__________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 2:   Number of Participants in Gender/Ethnicity by Age Groups (Percent of Age Group in Parentheses) 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                       Detained                          Community 
                __________________________________        _____________________________________ 
 
    11-13        14-15        16-17        18-24         11-13        14-15        16-17        18-24 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Males 
 
African-American 27 (37) 40 (22) 47 (24) 70 (30) 24 (21) 49 (31) 32 (16) 47 (20)   
           
Hispanic 12 (16) 30 (16) 25 (13) 47 (20) 15 (13) 16 (10) 22 (11) 32 (14)                        
    
Non-Hispanic White 13 (18) 41 (22) 46 (24) 48 (21) 20 (17) 30 (19) 55 (28) 50 (21) 
 
 Asian and Other 2 (3) 4 (2) 2 (1) 0 1 (1) 1 (1) 4 (2) 3 (1) 
 
Females 
 
 African-American 14 (19) 20 (11) 27 (14) 29 (12) 23 (20) 33 (21) 33 (17) 39 (17) 
 
 Hispanic 3 (4) 23 (12) 23 (12) 12 (5) 8 (7) 15 (9) 19 (10) 24 (10) 
 
 Non-Hispanic White 2 (3) 24 (13) 21 (11) 27 (12) 22 (19) 15 (9) 33 (17) 37 (16) 
 
 Asian and Other 0 4 (2) 1 (1) 0 3 (2) 0 0 1 (1) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 
Means (s.d.) for MacCAT-CA Understanding, Reasoning, and Appreciation Subscales  
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Age Groups (N)  Understanding  Reasoning  Appreciation 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
11-13  (190)  10.45 (3.31)a  11.30 (2.82)a   9.68  (2.34)a 
 
14-15  (345)  11.27 (2.97)b  12.10 (2.55)b  10.33 (1.79)b 
 
16-17  (392)  12.00 (2.82)c  12.76 (2.34)c  10.65 (1.66)b,c 
 
18-24 (466)  12.13  (2.92)c  12.57 (2.51)b,c  10.77 (1.57)c 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: Superscripts refer to age group comparisons for each subscale considered separately.  Age groups with different superscripts differed 
significantly on that subscale, at p<.05. 
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Table 4 
 
Simultaneous Logistic Regressions Predicting Confession, Full Disclosure to Public Defender, and Plea Agreement 
         Confession              Disclosurea                   Plea_______                    
 
Predictor  β Odds Ratio β Odds Ratio β Odds Ratio  
 
 
Age Group  -0.67**      .51  -0.15       .86  -0.39**   .68 
 
Intelligence  -0.01**      .99   0.31+       1.36         0.10  1.10 
 
Socioeconomic       -0.23**      .80   0.06      1.06 -0.18*    .83 
  Status 
 
Detained/Comm. -0.76**      .47  -0.57*         .57  -0.41**   .67 
 
White/Other  -0.20          .82   0.35      1.41  0.18  1.19 
 
African Am./Other   -0.15          .86   0.01         1.00 -0.04    .96 
 
Gender b  -0.42**      .66  -0.78**       .46           -0.47**   .62 
 
 
aDependent variable is full disclosure to public defender.  Only gender (β=-0.95, p<.001, odds ratio=.39) significantly predicted disclosure to a 
private attorney.  
 
b
 0=female, 1=male.  
+p < .05. *p < .01. **p < .001. 
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Figure 1.  Degree of impairment on MacCAT-CA Understanding, Reasoning, and Appreciation subscales as a function of age. 
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Figure 2.  Proportion of individuals at different ages who are significantly impaired with respect to either or both MacCAT-CA Understanding and 
Reasoning 
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
Figure 3.  Impairment on MacCAT-CA Understanding subscale as a function of age and justice system status 
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Figure 4.  Proportion of individuals at different ages who are significantly impaired with respect to either or both MacCAT-CA Understanding and 
Reasoning as a function of age and justice system status.   
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Figure 5.  Impairment on MacCAT-CA Understanding, Reasoning, and Appreciation subscales as a function of IQ. 
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Figure 6.  Proportion of individuals who are significantly impaired with respect to either or both MacCAT-CA Understanding and Reasoning as a 
function of IQ. 
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Figure 7.  Proportion of individuals at different ages who are significantly impaired with respect to either or both MacCAT-CA Understanding and 
Reasoning as a function of age and IQ. 
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Figure 8.  Proportion of detained individuals at different IQ levels as a function of age. 
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
Figure 9. Decision choices for Police Interrogation, Attorney Consultation, and Plea Agreement vignettes as a function of age. 
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Figure 10.   Authority Compliance Scores as a Function of Age 
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